The Discourses of Epictetus with Running Commentary – Book I, Chapter 13

Thirteenth installment:

Arrian, a student of Epictetus, wrote eight books, The Discourses of Epictetus, of which four survive. Selections from those eight books were also collected in the Enchiridion, or “Handbook.”  The Discourses give us a quite vivid portrait of the man who inspired them, and also give us fascinating glimpses into his singular didactic style. We very quickly see how Epictetus ran his school, the nature of its curricula, and how he mentored his students. We see his earnestness, his zeal, and piety, but we also get a good dose of his sharp and often acerbic sense of humor. It is no wonder that Arrian felt he ‘had to get this down.’

It also can be quite a challenge to understand exactly what is being said in the chapters of the Discourses. The text is composed of lecture notes, we must recall.

So, with that  genesis in mind, I’ve set out to read through the four books, a chapter at a time, while also breaking up the text with commentary, (essentially my best guesses as to how we might flesh out what can be very brief or truncated sketches of dialogue and argumentation), as it was no easy business for Arrian to get down what he had experienced in the lecture halls of Nicopolis!

Commentary is in italics! Also, please forgive any formatting issues (spacing between paragraphs) that you see. They stubbornly will not go away no matter what I do!

Book I, Chapter 13

How May Each Several Thing be Done Acceptably to the Gods?

This quite brief chapter continues the subject matter of the last two. It is, in one aspect, it presents lighter fare than the last few we have slogged through, but, even there, it is still indicative of the Stoic point of view, in that, via that light entry, we encounter admonitions to treat other human beings as if they were, not only immediate family, deserving similar respect and forbearance, but it offers, again, explanation for this requirement; that explanation which the Stoics hold in common with Judeo-Christian views of humanity; We are all sons of God.

This chapter, again, gives us real-world and common situations as illustrations of proper behavior and treatment of others. This is done to drive home the point that the Stoics, in contrast to other schools, such as the Cynics, consider it our divinely ordained business to be active members of society, and to carry out our various natural and acquired roles with respect and dignity always squarely in mind. In matters both large and small, we are expected to carry this out without complaint.

On that lighter note, Epictetus argues there are ways of tending to our bodily needs that reflect that dignity, and ways that do not. ‘Hew,’ he says, ‘to the former, and avoid the latter!’

Now when someone asked him (Epictetus) how it is possible to eat acceptably to the gods, he said, “If it is done justly and graciously and fairly and restrainedly and decently, is it not also done acceptably to the gods?

Using terms like ‘just,’ ‘gracious, ‘fair,’ restrained,’ and ‘decent’ allows Epictetus to answer that question while bringing the discussion around to the more important matter of how to properly treat fellow man:

And when you have asked for warm water and the slave does not heed you; or if he does heed you but brings in tepid water; or if he is not even to be found in the house, then to refrain from anger and not to explode, is not this acceptable to the gods?”

On behalf of the peeved slave-owner, we get this response:

“How, then, can a man bear with such persons?”

To which Epictetus responds, pointedly calling his interlocutor ‘slave’:

“Slave, will you not bear with your own brother, who has Zeus as his progenitor and is, as it were, a son born of the same seed as yourself and of the same sowing from above; but if you have been stationed in a like position above others, will you forthwith set yourself up as a tyrant? Do you not remember what you are, and over whom you rule—that they are kinsmen, that they are brothers by nature, that they are the offspring of Zeus?

There is a three-fold purpose in calling the man a slave. Firstly, Epictetus wants to remind him, and all of us, through this man as our proxy, that every person, (including servants and slaves who cater to us, and who may be treated, by human convention, as ‘owned’ by other human beings), is in an identical role with regard to divine paternity, and as such, on a dignified level, despite human convention.

Secondly, and consequent to that status, he insists that the slave owner remain aware that his slaves are his brothers and sisters in every relevant respect.

Thirdly, Epictetus is, is probably reminding himself, and us, that this is how his own mentor, Rufus, had addressed him, when Epictetus was a slave allowed to sit as his student.

The overall gist of this section: We are all in the same boat, viz our natural or assigned place in the cosmos, so none of us should give ourselves airs or think we have special permission to treat other human beings with contempt, or as mere chattel. That admonition holds especially in societies that practice slavery.  Still, one might expect a slave owner in such society, a man like this interlocutor, might be a bit dense about this and offer some sort of objection along the following lines regarding his slaves, upon whom he is dependent:

But I have a deed of sale for them, and they have none for me.

In other words, he says something like, ‘I have a legally recognized title of ownership for these persons, so I can rest easy in treating them as my property!’ Epictetus has a sharp response:

Do you see whither you bend your gaze, that it is to the earth, that it is to the pit, that it is to these wretched laws of ours, the laws of the dead, and that it is not to the laws of the gods that you look?

Appeal to legal convention in order to justify slavery, and bad treatment of slaves, is a non-starter, for those laws are ‘wretched,’ of the earth, and not indicative of, or responsive to, our shared status as sons of God. Laws concerning property are properly constituted as dealing exclusively with non-sentient items, ‘dead’ things, not persons.

Epictetus says this to this slave-owner: ‘If you would but refer to the ‘laws of the gods,’ laws evident to your reason, you would see that this is true, and would never entertain such thoughts as you here unashamedly voice.’