Twelfth installment:
Arrian, a student of Epictetus, wrote eight books, The Discourses of Epictetus, of which four survive. Selections from those eight books were also collected in the Enchiridion, or “Handbook.” The Discourses give us a quite vivid portrait of the man who inspired them, and also give us fascinating glimpses into his singular didactic style. We very quickly see how Epictetus ran his school, the nature of its curricula, and how he mentored his students. We see his earnestness, his zeal, and piety, but we also get a good dose of his sharp and often acerbic sense of humor. It is no wonder that Arrian felt he ‘had to get this down.’
It also can be quite a challenge to understand exactly what is being said in the chapters of the Discourses. The text is composed of lecture notes, we must recall.
So, with that genesis in mind, I’ve set out to read through the four books, a chapter at a time, while also breaking up the text with commentary, (essentially my best guesses as to how we might flesh out what can be very brief or truncated sketches of dialogue and argumentation), as it was no easy business for Arrian to get down what he had experienced in the lecture halls of Nicopolis!
Commentary is in italics! Also, please forgive any formatting issues (spacing between paragraphs) that you see. They stubbornly will not go away no matter what I do!
Book I Chapter 12
Of Contentment
This chapter continues the treatment of Stoic theology and its relationship with man’s role in the world, with a considerable focus upon, as the title suggests, what is the appropriate attitude to take toward life, adversity and who to ultimately blame for individual misery or ‘discontentment.’
Concerning gods there are some who say that the divine does not so much as exist; and others, that it exists, indeed, but is inactive and indifferent, and takes forethought for nothing; and a third set, that it exists and takes forethought, though only for great and heavenly things and in no case for terrestrial things; and a fourth set, that it also takes forethought for things terrestrial and the affairs of men, but only in a general way, and not for the individual in particular; and a fifth set, to which Odysseus and Socrates belonged, who say:
‘Nor when I move am I concealed from thee.’
Epictetus is letting us know here that he is going to talk, in this chapter, in more detail than previously, about the Stoic view concerning Gods, or as he puts it, ‘the divine,’ and its relationship to the world of man. His first task is to differentiate the different possible positions on the matter. Here we see, in order; the atheistic view, the Epicurean deist view (that gods do exist but are wholly separated from the universe, neither acting upon it, or concerned about it); another view which has it that the divine does concern itself with the universe, but only insofar as to govern things on the largest scale, leaving the microcosmic (and hence the terrestrial) to develop on its own; a fourth view according to which the divine does concern itself with the smaller scale, but only ‘generally,’ (whatever that may mean) and, finally; a fifth position according to which the divine is cognizant of, and concerned with all aspects of the universe down to the terrestrial, including the lives of individual human beings. This latter is the view, not only of Odysseus and Socrates, but is the view of the Stoics.
We must, therefore, first of all enquire about each of these statements, to see whether it is sound or not sound.
The question here raised as to the ‘soundness’ of the five positions has to do, not so much with the simple question of truth, but with the rationality or irrationality of acting as if they do obtain. He begins with the atheistic position:
For if gods do not exist, how can it be an end to follow the gods?
Clearly, it would be irrational for a convinced atheist to adopt the ‘end’ of following the divine. Next, the Epicurean view:
And if they exist, indeed, but care for nothing, how even thus will that conclusion be sound?
Here again, the ‘conclusion’ or goal of ‘following the gods’ would not make much rational sense, as there is no connection between the divine and the universe, by which one could carry out that task. Next, up is the third view.
But if, indeed, they both exist and exercise care, yet there is no communication from them to men, —yes, and, by Zeus, to me personally, — how even in this case can our conclusion still be sound?
On this view, according to which the divine concerns itself and bothers with the universe’s large-scale functioning, ignoring the small scale and terrestrial, there is no information provided us as to how the divine would like us to behave. So, again, it’s quite clearly not logically possible to follow non-existent guidance.
The good and excellent man must, therefore, inquire into all these things, before he subordinates his own will to him who administers the universe, precisely as good citizens submit to the law of the state.
Only if one takes the latter view can one consistently maintain both that there is some sort of divine guidance communicated to us, and that it is possible to follow it. Once that has been granted, one can then undertake the task of detecting what the content of that guidance might be. Now, Epictetus does not here directly state what leads him to believe the fifth position is in fact the correct one viz the relationship that exists between an existent God and man, but we can sketch an argument based upon what we have already seen. We’ll see elements of the argument developed as we progress in the Discourses as well.
If the most likely explanation for the existence of life is that it has been designed and created, then the designer/creators must be intelligent, and rational agents. They have ends for which they created living things. So, we can eliminate the first two positions above. What is more, we humans have a capacity to detect the actions of intelligence. These beings would not have created us with that capacity hard-wired into us unless they expected us to successfully detect their presence. So, there was some sort of desire to communicate with us, down here on the microlevel. So, options three and four are eliminated as possibilities. This leaves us with option five as being the most likely. Given that we accept that it is the case, we accept that there is some sort of guidance being given to us. We can then proceed to ask questions about that guidance, and what our proper attitude toward it should be. Epictetus suggests some natural questions along this line:
And he that is being instructed ought to come to his instruction with this aim, “How may I follow the gods in everything, and how may I be acceptable to the divine administration, and how may I become free?” (Since he is free for whom all things happen according to his Moral Purpose, and whom none can restrain.)
Again, if we take it that rational designers have brought us into being, then it is quite obvious that they did this on purpose. The most apparent likely reason is that they want us to function in some way as subsidiary rational agents. It’s no accident, on this view, that we have the cognitive and rational capacities we have. We can safely take it that they intend for us to learn things as we exercise our capacities, and that we, as intentionally created goal directed or teleological beings are expected to act in that way. In so doing we are intended to bring about, by our actions, fruition of end states toward which they aim. Our actions will, in some way, coordinate, interface with and flow along with theirs, and the overall development of the universe as it (and our) lives unfold needs this subsidiary cooperation. In short, we are intended to take part in the administration of the cosmos.
At the same time, we see in our similar volitional natures, that we like the divine are free agents. So, we can ask in what precisely our freedom consists, and what we are intended to gain for ourselves in the exercise of that freedom. For, we have not been accidently designed as capable of enjoying fulfilments of various sorts. Those too, are part of the package deal, so to speak.
This is an occasion where Epictetus means by the use of the Greek word translated by the phrase “Moral Purpose,” to emphasize our free will. In other context he means to indicate, by that same phrase, our status as free and moral agents, ones concerned with service to the good, and with the well-being of ourselves and our peers. Here, though he is wont to emphasis our similarity to the divine in our being free and ‘unhindered’ agents. Only our own choices determine our actions and destiny, just as the choices of the divine, the designs of the divine, determine the overall destiny of the cosmos. We’ve seen him make that case quite strongly in the closing sections of the last chapter as he wrapped up his discussion of the case of the runaway father. So, focusing on the freedom we have, he asks if we are intended to exercise that freedom in ways that are, in large part, unhinged or unconnected with the overall purpose for which we and the universe exist:
What then? Is freedom insanity? Far from it; for madness and freedom are not consistent with one another.
The madman is irrational, and unable to cognize the true nature of things. He is buffeted about by his mental illness, and cannot extricate himself from that prison, so to speak. He is unable distinguish what is actually good for him from what appears to be good. So, while, in a technical sense, he may be described as freely choosing to act, he chooses under illusion, and, is therefore not free in any substantial sense of the word. For he is unable to draw distinctions between what appears to be the best for him, and what actually is the best.
“But I would have that which seems best to me happen in every case, no matter how it comes to seem so.”
“You are mad; you are beside yourself. Do you not know that freedom is a noble and precious thing? But for me to desire at haphazard that those things should happen which have at haphazard seemed best to me, is dangerously near being, not merely not noble, but even in the highest degree shameful.”
A better descriptor for someone in this sorry state might be ‘pitiable.’ We see, in such cases, men and women that are incapable of being instructed by their senses, or others, as to the true nature of things. They act haphazardly, in that spur of the moment appearances lead them this way and that, while also clouding their ability to perceive the truth. Being “able” to choose on such haphazard basis is not really operating freely, but in the prison of illusion.
In other realms of activity, we do not count such haphazard acts, and inability to profit from instruction, as of much value. An instance is writing:
For how do we act in writing? Do I desire to write the name “Dio” as I choose? No, but I am taught to desire to write it as it ought to be written. What do we do in music? The same. And what in general, where there is any art or science? The same; otherwise knowledge of anything would be useless, if it were accommodated to every individual’s whims.
In each of these cases, we accomplish these tasks by being capable of receiving instruction, and then tailoring our free choices, our actions, so as to conform to those instructions.
Now, considering freedom itself, our capacity for choice, is it at its most valuable when we exercise it without taking instruction as to how best to exercise it as human beings? The answer here is again ‘no’:
Is it, then, only in this matter of freedom, the greatest and indeed the highest of all, that I am permitted to desire at haphazard? By no means, but instruction consists precisely in learning to desire each thing exactly as it happens. And how do they happen? As he that ordains them has ordained.
Again, he is having us think of ourselves as being in that subsidiary administrative role as compared to the divine, and as being under personal tutelage of that divine administration, playing our roles well. Furthermore, those roles are taken to be maximally tuned and essential to bringing about the best state of affairs, so, we should will that our roles be precisely what they find them to be, and should make efforts to shape our attitudes toward those roles as coming from the space of appreciation and of the most conscientious application. Here, Epictetus is describing that divine administration in personal and monotheistic language:
And he has ordained that there be summer and winter, and abundance and dearth, and virtue and vice, and all such opposites, for the harmony of the whole, and he has given each of us a body, and members of the body, and property and companions.
Mindful, therefore, of this ordaining we should go to receive instruction, not in order to change the constitution of things, (for this is neither vouchsafed us nor is it better that it should be), but in order that, things about us being as they are and as their nature is, we may, for our own part, keep our wills in harmony with what happens.
We should not be so presumptuous as to assume we can better organize the cosmos than has that divine administrator, nor should we think that it is our role to do so. To use the language again; we are subsidiary agents, and can tell that this is our role. Our limited grasp on the big picture should also lead us to humility and patience when we undertake to live our lives. The primary focus of our humility and patience will have to do with those other human beings with which we are surrounded, and with whom we are expected to interact, again, by God’s design.
For, look you, can we escape from men? And how is it possible? But can we, if they associate with us, change them?
We can certainly try, but there is no guarantee that they will change, or that the changes we want to bring about are proper. So, again approach such efforts with realism and humility.
And who vouchsafes us that power?
And who is it that found it wise to limit that power we have over others? God. He also intends for us to live in the thick of human society. That can be sometimes bothersome. What option do we have in dealing with that fact? Given we are not intended to retreat from society and live as hermits, what options do we have?
What alternative remains, then, or what method can we find for living with them? Some such method as that, while they will act as seems best to them, we shall none the less be in a state conformable to nature.
We will patiently carry out our social roles, each of us thinking we are doing what is best for us individually or socially. We Stoics will do so, while also using that conceptual lens we’ve adopted. We will take it that we should be interacting with others in a way that aligns us with the intentions of that divine administration of the world, i.e., what amounts to our best guess as to the way nature is intended to be organized and is intended to function.
Be that as it may, this is all very easy to describe in the abstract. When it comes down to actual life with others, we are prone to impatience, irascibility, and often want to get away from others and retreat from society. What then?
But you are impatient and peevish, and if you are alone, you call it a solitude, but if you are in the company of men, you call them schemers and brigands, and you find fault even with your own parents and children and brothers and neighbors. But you ought, when staying alone, to call that peace and freedom, and to look upon yourself as like the gods; and when you are in the company of many, you ought not call that a mob, nor a tumult, nor a disgusting thing, but a feast and a festival, and so accept all things contentedly.
Here we run up against a form of the principle word in the title for this chapter ‘contentment.’ The idea seems to be that one should try ones best, as Stoic, to adapt one’s attitudes toward others to what they should be if it is indeed true that everything has been ordered for the best, by an extremely wise and beneficent divine administration. Even if one is not able to cognize the particulars of that wise ordering of things, and it may appear that things are quite otherwise in actuality, one should nevertheless make efforts to tailor one’s attitudes in this way if one is indeed convinced of the accuracy of the world view. It may be that such full knowledge is not available to us, and lack of it renders us unable to see how the sometimes evil, sometimes demented, sometimes selfish, behavior of others could in any way serve the good. We should nevertheless accept this as at least a possibility if we are truly convinced of the big picture we profess. Given we do make efforts in this direction, we must be patient with ourselves and others, as hard as that undoubtedly is. And, what is to become of us if we do not make this effort at acceptance of what life brings?
What, then, is the punishment of those who do not accept?
To be just as they are.
Is one peevish because he is alone? Let him be in solitude!
Is he peevish with his parents? Let him be an evil son and grieve!
Is he peevish with his children? Let him be a bad father!
The person, be he a practicing Stoic, or anyone else, that adopts these attitudes is miserable in these several ways, and, in the case of the former, his misery is compounded by the fact that he sees his own inconsistency. That is a form of punishment above and beyond any that he may be given by society:
“Throw him into prison.”
What sort of prison?
Where he now is. For he is there against his will, and where a man is against his will, that for him is a prison. Just as Socrates was not in prison, for he was there willingly.
A straightforward conceptual truth is being conveyed here: In any case where a person is in a place or situation that he or she does not want to be, that person is in effect being held against his or her will, and is in effect, imprisoned. On the other hand, if a person willingly enters a place or situation, then, no matter the trappings of that place or situation, that person is not being held against will. Epictetus illustrates, again, with the case of Socrates, who did not want to either escape his trial, his sentencing, nor the sentence itself. He sat in jail awaiting his execution willingly, and provided an argument to justify this choice. So, even though he was physically being held in a prison, he was not, in actuality imprisoned.
The point here is that seriously committed Stoics will find, when they react to events and people around them with ‘peevishness,’ or other such emotions, as are described here, they imprison themselves, for this is not a position such persons avowedly want to be in. Again, these practicing Stoics are doing things that are against what they will for themselves. They want to be working partners with the divine that truly appreciate the opportunity they have been given by their situations, even down to the nitty-gritty of every sordid detail! For, on their view, it is all necessary to divine purpose, and they are intended, always, to benefit from circumstances. Again, attaining and maintaining this attitude is no easy task, and requires a lifetime of commitment.
Another mini-dialogue is now presented, of some representative man becoming vexed at a disability, which not coincidently, is like that of Epictetus himself, lameness. (It might be that he’s giving us another bit of honest autobiography here about his less than stellar moments in adhering to the practical application or attitudinal perspectives that should follow from the acceptance of the tenets of Stoic metaphysics. Is this back-and-forth another memory of Rufus giving him the business?):
“Alas, that I should be lame in my leg!”
“Slave, do you then, because of one paltry leg blame the universe? Will you not make a free gift of it to the whole? Will you not relinquish it? Will you not gladly yield it to the giver? And will you be angry and peevish at the ordinances of Zeus, which he defined and ordained together with the Fates who spun in his presence the thread of your begetting? Do you not know how small a part you are compared with the whole? That is, as to the body; for as to the reason you are not inferior to the gods, nor less than they; for the greatness of the reason is not determined by length nor by height, but by the decisions of its will. Will you not, therefore, set what is for you the good in that wherein you are equal to the gods?”
Again, there is a pointed admonition here toward humility in the face of our individual lives’ servings of adversity. Given the extremely brief spatio-temporal span of human life, indeed of the entirety of human history, when compared with the immensity within which it is contained, it should not surprise us that we will suffer things that seem unfair and have, from our point of view, an incomprehensible or perhaps impossible connection with any good state of affairs toward which they may contribute, (indeed the claim of any sort of connection may seem patently absurd). Yet, if we do take it as most likely that we are subordinate administrators to God, we should assume that such is actually the case, appearances notwithstanding. Furthermore, we have affinity with that governing intelligence, and are as unencumbered in exercise of will as it is. So, we should inhabit and ride life from within that seat of our will, and align our will with it, in assurance that, come what may, we serve vital subsidiary roles in the unfolding of its great plan.
Epictetus is addressing us in something like this way: Be aware that you will run into challenges no matter the roles you inhabit. Remember that these roles, these various assignments, are not within your control, but you are nevertheless duty bound to take them, and should not waste efforts in complaining about things that are, or were fundamentally outside your control as you came into being, and continue to live. Instead, take cognizance of the imbedded gifts provided you, which also came to you by your very existence, and by way of your being placed in your circumstance, and which continue, through your tenure here on Earth, to be given you by virtue of your unfolding roles and circumstances in our world. These are all fine-tuned in a precise way that will not only enable endurance of everything that befalls you, but will also allow you to extract the gifts:
“Wretched man that I am; such a father and such a mother as I have!” Well, was it permitted you to step forward and make selection, saying, “Let such-and-such man have intercourse with such-and-such woman at this hour; that I may be born?” It was not permitted you; but your parents had to exist first, then you had to be born as you were born. Of what kind of parents? Of such as they were. What then? Since they are such, is no remedy given you?
Again, supposing that you were ignorant of the purpose for which you possess the faculty of vision, you would be unfortunate and wretched if you closed your eyes when men brought some color before them; but in that you have greatness of mind and nobility for use for every one of the things that may happen to you, and know it not, are you not yet more unfortunate and wretched? Things proportionate to the faculty which you possess are brought before you, but you turn that faculty away at the very moment when you ought to keep it wide open and discerning. Do you not rather render thanks to the gods that they have allowed you to be superior to all the things that they did not put under your control, and have rendered you accountable only for what is under your control?
Anyone who is sighted but knowingly closes his eyes, and is therefore, never able to use his sight for its intended purpose is pitiable. That is obvious. So too, anyone that does not make use of our human reasoning faculty, and its partner, man’s free will. Precisely in cases where he is able to note what is or is not in his direct control, yet passes on exerting that control, he is like this intentionally blind man in that he loses opportunity to recognize and develop his true powers, not necessarily power over external circumstance, but power over how he responds to circumstance. He fails in taking mastery over self, instead choosing servitude and dependency upon the contingencies of his situation.
What is more, these others that vex this hypothetical Stoic, (his less-than-ideal parents and siblings), are ultimately accountable for their actions. It is they, not the vexed Stoic, who have total control over themselves. So too the Stoic’s life, limb and property; these are externals as well. The only thing over which he has complete control is how he responds to his circumstances, for that alone will he be held responsible by God.
As for parents, the gods have released you from accountability; as for brothers, they have released you; as for body, they have released you; and for property, death, life. Well, for what have they made you accountable? For the only thing that is under your control—the proper use of impressions. Why, then, do you draw upon yourself that for which you are not responsible? This is to make trouble for yourself.
“The proper use of impressions,” the proper relationship between the actions and attitudes that experiences or emotions may immediately suggest to us, and the opportunities they present for more reasoned and carefully considered responses which are always available to us; that is the question at hand. Taking control of one’s life in exactly this fashion is the goal of the Stoic, and it helps to have as goad or inspiration, the metaphysical picture in mind; God envisioned as teacher presenting lessons and learning opportunities with each such immediate impression. More to come.