Neither Athens nor Sparta—Reconsidering the Mission of the Naval Academy

Since the COVID pandemic, the word unprecedented has been used constantly—almost always, I believe, incorrectly. There’s a precedent for just about everything if you examine history carefully enough. Alongside this overuse, we’ve also seen a growing tendency to catastrophize nearly every national news story. I believe we’re in one such moment at the Naval Academy. As we confront changes and a fundamental reconsideration of the Academy’s purpose, the term *unprecedented* again rings out, paired with a high volume of voices choosing to catastrophize this moment.

In 1979, author John Lovell published *Neither Athens Nor Sparta: The American Service Academies in Transition*, which focused on reform and modernization efforts in the decades following WWII. Revisiting that book reminded me that our current debates are neither unprecedented nor catastrophic. Lovell’s framing captured a long-standing tension between two visions: an “Athenian” liberal arts model—wisdom, culture, diversity—and a “Spartan” military model—discipline, fitness, and technical expertise.

To visualize the debate, imagine a horizontal line. On the far left: Athenian purists who might wish the Academy resembled nearby St. John’s College, with its focus on authors like Maya Angelou, Dostoevsky, and Rousseau. For the record, I believe that’s a beautiful way to study and learn.

On the far right: Spartan purists who envision an Academy modeled on a 47-month Greyhull cruise, Leatherneck, or SEAL Screener. This, too, has its merits—especially in times of war, such as WWII.

But where should the institution fall along this spectrum today? Both impulses—Athens and Sparta—are rooted in valid educational philosophies. Still, hard choices must be made. And while I avoid zero-sum thinking, I recognize that real constraints on our attention and effort demand that we privilege one perspective over the other.

Over the past year, the Stockdale Center has focused on preparing leaders for the envisioned challenges of great power competition. Specifically: What are we doing to prepare for a potential large-scale war with China in the Indo-Pacific Theater? If there’s even a 10% chance of such a conflict by 2027, I believe we must lean toward a more Spartan approach. That doesn’t mean abandoning the liberal tradition. But it does mean our institutional decisions must reflect the strategic reality of the historical moment we inhabit.

I understand those who fear that, through tactical decisions, we may surrender deeply held values. There’s time and space for that debate. But I’m not willing to take our eyes off the number one priority: preparing future leaders to lead sailors and Marines into harm’s way. This moment demands it. Doing anything less is not worth the risk. I’m content to let history judge the choices we make.

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