Twenty-first installment:
Arrian, a student of Epictetus, wrote eight books, The Discourses of Epictetus, of which four survive. Selections from those eight books were also collected in the Enchiridion, or “Handbook.” The Discourses give us a quite vivid portrait of the man who inspired them, and also give us fascinating glimpses into his singular didactic style. We very quickly see how Epictetus ran his school, the nature of its curricula, and how he mentored his students. We see his earnestness, his zeal, and piety, but we also get a good dose of his sharp and often acerbic sense of humor. It is no wonder that Arrian felt he ‘had to get this down.’
It also can be quite a challenge to understand exactly what is being said in the chapters of the Discourses. The text is composed of lecture notes, we must recall. The subject matter sometimes jumps from one subject to another, veering into matters that are not obviously related to what we have just read. Sometimes these tangential matters are finally related back to things brought up earlier, or to the main topic of the chapter. Sometimes they are not. This leaves the reader with the task of finding the connections. Epictetus deliberately ‘weaves’ in an almost conversational style. His is most certainly not the style of the tightly outlined academic’s essay. He does not write like Aristotle, nor, if we are to believe his own testimony, like the Stoic school’s founders (chief among them, Chrysippus). Yet, we can see, as we ride his ‘weave’ that he was quite versed in all aspects of the school’s doctrine.
So, with that genesis, and that style of writing in mind, I’ve set out to read through the four extant books, a chapter at a time, while also breaking up the text with commentary, (essentially my best guesses as to how we might flesh out some of his ‘weave,’ (what can be very brief or truncated sketches of dialogue and argumentation), as it was no easy business for Arrian to get down what he had experienced in the lecture halls of Nicopolis!
A last note: I use the Oldfather translation in the Loeb Classical Library, and have taken some editorial and interpretive liberties where I thought it necessary. But, I’ve tried to keep such changes to a minimum. The advantage of using this translation is that it can easily be accessed via various online sources, and given that it presents, along with Oldfather’s translation and footnotes, the text in the original Greek, it is quite useful for those that would like to check any translations or interpretations against the original.
Book I Chapter 21
To Those Who Would be Admired
As I read it, this quite brief chapter is really aimed at Epictetus’s own ego. He’s dressing himself down for being puffed up and proud at being perceived as a ‘great philosopher.’ There is a lesson in the humor. He stands in for all of us, for we all, in some way or other will get puffed up over reputation from time to time, and can not only set ourselves up for precipitous fall when the high opinions of those others we presently enjoy take a turn for the worse, but, more importantly will, in focusing on that repute, and reveling in the attention, be focusing our energies and pursuits in the wrong direction. We work toward acquisition or maintenance of that high repute instead of doing our assigned job in the administration of that part of the cosmos to which we have been stationed. While it is probably psychologically impossible to expect that we not have some tincture of pride in recognition for jobs well done, the message here is that we should not allow desire for this to dominate our motivations.
When a man has his proper station in life, he is not all agape for things beyond it.
This is a statement of the ideal attitude we should take when we find our assigned niche, and are aware that it is indeed our proper place.
Man, what is it you want to have happen to you?
As for myself, I am content if I exercise desire and aversion in accordance with nature, if I employ choice and refusal as my nature is, and similarly employ purpose and design and assent.
And this spells it out a bit more in terms of those concepts we’ve run into before (and which will be further explored as we proceed with the Discourses); desire, aversion, assent, choice, and the connection of these with proper understanding of nature and teleology (design and purpose).
Good. Again, this is a portrait of the proper attitude Stoic’s should take toward their lives and work. Does Epictetus live up to this? No. Not all the time, at any rate. A student gives him ‘what-for.’ As we have seen, Epictetus was more than willing to give his student’s some ‘what-for.’ ‘Sauce for goose is sauce for the gander,’ this student, no doubt, thought, as he screwed up his courage and piped in. ‘Epictetus cannot possibly protest!’
Why, then, do you walk around in our presence as though you had swallowed a spit?
Imagine a faculty member walking around proudly, chest thrown out, subdued but jaunty gait, an equally subtle look of smugness and superiority, feeling like a celebrity among the adoring. There are modern slang equivalents of the phrase ‘swallowed a spit,’ that could be substituted. Feel free to swap!
The student is asking Epictetus why he is behaving in this way, a way for which he often takes others to task. Does Epictetus take umbrage? No. We get an honest, frank, and somewhat unexpected admission:
“It has always been my wish that those who meet me should admire me and as they follow me should exclaim, ‘O the great philosopher!’ ”
Give him credit, Epictetus admits he’s got an ego. The student takes the opening, and delivers this banger:
Who are those people by whom you wish to be admired? Are they not these about whom you are in the habit of saying that they are mad? What then? Do you wish to be admired by the mad?
This brings to mind what Epictetus said in chapter 20 about delusion. The student is here throwing back at Epictetus a point he had made when his students complained about the hard work. Remember, he had them consider how they would choose between two hypothetical losses, either failure of eyesight or loss of rationality (the ability to tell delusion from reality), and chastised them for what seems to have been the majority opinion; the belief that retention of sight was to be preferred.
On that occasion, he more or less accused them of choosing to be mad by being lazy in their work. The notion is one he expresses on more than one occasion. Well, in losing his focus, and focusing on garnering positive attention for the sake of positive attention, Epictetus is also losing his focus, straying from the task, and choosing to not do his work. He too is, in effect, choosing to be yet another madman-lite, or is being carried away by praise from such people.
Through the agency of his student interlocutors, Epictetus is here reminding himself (and his readers) that he’s just as human as those students he lambastes!