Fifteenth installment:
Arrian, a student of Epictetus, wrote eight books, The Discourses of Epictetus, of which four survive. Selections from those eight books were also collected in the Enchiridion, or “Handbook.” The Discourses give us a quite vivid portrait of the man who inspired them, and also give us fascinating glimpses into his singular didactic style. We very quickly see how Epictetus ran his school, the nature of its curricula, and how he mentored his students. We see his earnestness, his zeal, and piety, but we also get a good dose of his sharp and often acerbic sense of humor. It is no wonder that Arrian felt he ‘had to get this down.’
It also can be quite a challenge to understand exactly what is being said in the chapters of the Discourses. The text is composed of lecture notes, we must recall.
So, with that genesis in mind, I’ve set out to read through the four books, a chapter at a time, while also breaking up the text with commentary, (essentially my best guesses as to how we might flesh out what can be very brief or truncated sketches of dialogue and argumentation), as it was no easy business for Arrian to get down what he had experienced in the lecture halls of Nicopolis!
Commentary is in italics! Also, please forgive any formatting issues (spacing between paragraphs) that you see. They stubbornly will not go away no matter what I do!
Book I, Chapter 15
What Does [Stoic] Philosophy Profess?
This chapter gives a brief answer to the question of what philosophy’s proper or primary subject matter is. As we’ve already seen, that primary purpose is tied up with man as Moral Purpose. Here we also see it described as ‘the art of living.’ What this means is illustrated with the case of a family feud. A brother who is vexed at his sibling for being angry with him asks Epictetus for advice on how to persuade the brother to cease. ‘That,’ says Epictetus, ‘is not the role of philosopher.’ This is the first of several times we will see family strife figuring prominently as an example for Epictetus.
When someone consulted Epictetus as to how he could persuade his brother to cease being angry with him, he replied:
“Philosophy does not profess to secure for man any external possession. Otherwise it would be undertaking something that lies outside its proper subject-matter. For as wood is the material of the carpenter, bronze that of the statuary, just so, each man’s own life is the subject-matter of the art of living.”
The interlocutor persists, saying in effect, ‘look, Epictetus, that’s exactly what I’m trying to do, I’m trying to help my brother with ‘the art of living,’ am I not?
“Well, what about my brother’s life?”
“That again is the subject-matter of his own art of living, but with respect to your art of living it comes under the category of externals, like a farm, like health, like good repute. Philosophy promises none of these things, but rather, “In every circumstance I will keep the governing principle in a state of accord with nature.”
“Whose governing principle?”
“His in whom I am.”
This answer can be read in two ways. One is obvious, the other less so. Starting with the former, we can each say something like this, if we are convinced Stoics:
Firstly, my ‘governing principle’ is obviously mine, and mine only. It is the only governing principle over which I have any control. So, I should focus upon it, and not fool myself into thinking I can have such affect on any other person’s governing principle.
The second, less obvious reading has to do with Stoic theology, and can be stated something like this:
‘I am a part of God as governing principle. I am also aware of myself as the governing principle that lords it over my own body and my own actions. Therefore, I have an obligation to comport my own governing principle with the intent and purposes of that larger governing principle of which I am a part, I must render my actions as in accord with it; in accord with nature, as nature is God or is part of God. I must do my utmost to follow this path, even though there is much I do not know. I must undertake this project with the requisite amount of humility. In any case, I do know that I can follow the guidance of my inner genius in so doing, and I can also make sure that I do not illogically assume that I can control those things over which I do not have final control (externals).
This concerned sibling still focuses upon his brother:
“How, then, shall I keep my brother from being angry at me?”
“Bring him to me and I will tell him, but I have nothing to say to you on the subject of his anger.”
Epictetus is saying something like this:
‘The best I can do in the case of your brother’s anger toward you is to explain to him how he can overcome that anger himself. You have no way to keep him from being angry with you. That is ultimately up to him. You cannot turn off his grudges. Don’t expect to do so, and certainly do not expect that Epictetus or philosophy can do so. That is plainly against fact. For us to claim such abilities would be deceitful.’
Now, after having reflected on all this, Arrian reports that the man in question finally got it. He followed up with a better question:
And the man who was consulting him said, “What I seek to know is this, how, even if my brother refuses to be reconciled with me, I may yet be in accord with nature,”
Epictetus replied:
“Nothing great comes into being all at once; why, not even does the bunch of grapes, or a fig. If you say to me now, “I want a fig,” I shall answer, “That requires time.” Let the tree blossom first, then put forth its fruit, and finally let the fruit ripen. Now although the fruit of even a fig-tree is not brought to perfection all at once and in a single hour, would you still seek to secure the fruit of a man’s mind in so short a while and so easily? Do not expect it, not even if I should tell you so myself.”
Again, that persistent message: The work of being a ‘philosopher,’ in the full sense, a Stoic philosopher and man of application, is no easy business, and takes a lifetime.
We are going to see, in later chapters of the Discourses, that Epictetus does proffer more direct answers to precisely this question posed by our troubled sibling, answers derived from a careful analysis of the nature of brotherhood, and the nature of the roles constituted not only by familial relationships human-to-human, but human to God. It is not so much the ability to ferret out answers to this sort of question that is difficult and in need of time in order to accomplish, as it is the practical applications and implications the discovered strategies introduce. The courses of behavior such analysis suggest can be quite difficult to carry out. More on both of these matters will appear as we proceed with the Discourses.