Third installment:
Arrian, a student of Epictetus, wrote eight books, The Discourses of Epictetus, of which four survive. Selections from those eight books were also collected in the Enchiridion, or “Handbook.” The Discourses give us a quite vivid portrait of the man who inspired them, and also give us fascinating glimpses into his singular didactic style. We very quickly see how Epictetus ran his school, the nature of its curricula, and how he mentored his students. We see his earnestness, his zeal, and piety, but we also get a good dose of his sharp and often acerbic sense of humor. It is no wonder that Arrian felt he ‘had to get this down.’
It also can be quite a challenge to understand exactly what is being said in the chapters of the Discourses. The text is composed of lecture notes, we must recall.
So, with that genesis in mind, I’ve set out to read through the four books, a chapter at a time, while also breaking up the text with commentary, (essentially my best guesses as to how we might flesh out what can be very brief or truncated sketches of dialogue and argumentation), as it was no easy business for Arrian to get down what he had experienced in the lecture halls of Nicopolis!
Commentary is in italics! Also, please forgive some formatting issues (spacing between paragraphs) that stubbornly will not go away no matter what I do!
Book I, Chapter 3.
From the Thesis that God is the Father of Mankind How May One Proceed to the Consequences?
If a man could only subscribe heart and soul, as he ought, to this doctrine, that we are all primarily begotten of God, and that God is the father of men as well as of gods, I think that he will entertain no ignoble or mean thought about himself. Yet, if Caesar adopts you no one will be able to endure your conceit, but if you know that you are a son of Zeus, will you not be elated?
This brief paragraph (an introduction to an equally brief chapter), asks those that take seriously the contention that we are sons and daughters of divinity why we do not typically behave as though it is true. It draws an amusing comparison between the typical attitude taken toward themselves by those that accept this proposition and the attitude taken toward themselves by people that were adopted by Caesar. These latter invariably became puffed up and insufferable. They tended to peg the self-regard meter.
Epictetus asks why we don’t typically behave similarly with regard to our alleged divine parentage. Note here, that he plants the seeds of one possible explanation, by way of the terms he uses to put the question: He carefully states that we are primarily, though not exclusively, ‘begotten of God.’ What does this mean? He answers:
As it is, however, we are not (insufferably puffed up about this), but inasmuch as these two elements (the divine and the material, which he had earlier referenced) were comingled in our begetting, on the one hand the body, which we have in common with the brutes, and, on the other, reason and intelligence, which we have in common with the gods, some of us incline toward the former relationship, which is unblessed by fortune and is mortal, and only a few toward that which is divine and blessed.
Before we move on, a philosopher’s question comes to mind in light of this passage: If it is the case that we are primarily, but not exclusively ‘begotten’ of God, and it is also true that material was also involved in our ‘begetting,’ and unavoidably so, we could take this to mean that the two somehow or other must ‘partner’ in our origins. That being the case, we can ask whether or not the divine and the material are co-eternal.
Now, if we accept that they are co-eternal, a further question arises: Are they two aspects of one and the same thing, or are they metaphysically distinct from one another? Either may be the case, and such views being common in the history of human thought are borne out by what we have of Stoic’s and others’ metaphysical discussions and debates in the ancient world. The Stoic view seems to be a double-aspect view. Traditional theism takes the latter position.
In any case, there is a common practical consequence that falls out of the fact of our dual “comingled” nature: Our physical aspect has profound affect on our cognition and valuations. The case Epictetus makes here in the Discourses, time and again, about how the majority come at the mortal questions that are forced upon them by the bully’s threat, or similar phenomena, (the case he makes that most of us will at some point default to concern for life, property or pleasures over matters of Moral Purpose), indicates the profound and tight connection of our person with our material bodies and world. But, we saw also that he is at pains to say, there are the ‘red-threads,’ the exceptions among us; those already noted moral exemplars, who are remarkable precisely because they overcome the powerful influences borne of that tight connection:
Since, then, it is inevitable that every man, whoever he be, should deal with each thing according to the opinion which he forms about it, these few, who think that by their birth they are called to fidelity, to self-respect, and to unerring judgement in the use of external impressions, cherish no mean or ignoble thoughts about themselves, whereas the multitude do quite the opposite.
” For what am I? A miserable, paltry man,” say they, and, “Lo, my wretched, paltry flesh!”
Wretched indeed, but you have also something better than your paltry flesh. Why then abandon that and cleave to this? It is because of this kinship with the flesh that those of us who incline toward it become like wolves, faithless and treacherous and hurtful, and others like lions, wild and savage and untamed; but most of us become foxes, that is to say, rascals of the animal kingdom. For what else is a slanderous and malicious man but a fox, or something even more rascally and degraded? Take heed, therefore, and beware that you become not one of these rascally creatures.
Do note the language used here, as Epictetus utilizes the metaphor of the animal. Those of us who incline to, or predominately cater to our physical natures will, by doing so, find ourselves behaving ‘faithlessly,’ ‘treacherously,’ ‘hurtful of others,’ ‘wild,’ ‘savage,’ and ‘untamed.’ We’ll slander, and be otherwise ‘rascally.’ Most of these terms have moral signification. This should remind us that putting the physical first can lead us to moral compromise and loss of self-respect (especially if we live in Rome!) Those that do their utmost to put their moral duties and moral health first will not suffer this fate, even if they do lose their lives, reputations or possessions. They comport themselves in alignment with man’s ‘proper character’ to a greater degree than most of us (including Epictetus as he pointedly admitted in chapter 2). These exemplary individuals are closest to acting, in fullness, as ‘sons and daughters of God.’ Again, these rare accomplishments are rendered all-the-more remarkable by the fact that they are done in the face of the strong and sometimes overwhelming influences and demands of the material aspects of our being. They are testament to our ineliminable freedom, our Moral Purpose.